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Abstract

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is a broad federal corporate governance regulation.
With the Act, Congress refonns the process of financial statement disclosure by enacting
new rules for the behavior of corporate management, corporate audit committees, and
independent auditors. Scholars of law, public policy, and accounting debate the
appropriateness and effectiveness of federal corporate governance refonn. This paper
combines participant-centered and rule-centered comparative institutional choice
frameworks to discuss the institutional choices made during corporate governance
regulation. The participant-centered model examines majoritarian and minoritarian
influence during policy initiation. The rule-centered model compares the capacity and
competence of Congress, the SEC, and the federal judiciary during policy fonnulation.
This paper uses the example of regulating non-audit services provided by auditors to
demonstrate comparative institutional choice as a tool for selecting the optimal
institutional vehicle.
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Introduction
Scholars from a variety of disciplines have engaged to debate the efficacy and
appropriateness of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002 (H.R. 3763) since it was passed by
the United States Congress and signed into law by President Bush on July 30, 2002. The
social goal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) is to "protect investors by
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the
securities laws, and for other purposes."l
While many agree about the necessity of a social goal to "protect investors" in the
midst of corporate frauds that were widespread in 2002, many also raise questions about
the institution best suited to reform the audit profession. Much of the debate focuses on
the speed and force with which Congress took charge of audit regulation in the midst of
widespread corporate fraud. 2 Did Congress move too fast to effectively regulate a federal
level? Is it appropriate for members of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA), a private organization comprised of accountants, to continue
regulating the behavior of auditors? Should the federal judiciary make a ruling on audit
reform? To answer these questions, it is important for one to fully understand the stakes
of the participants, the social goal they pursue, and the institutions available to pursue it.
Comparative institutional choice analysis provides a framework for gathering
information about institutions and policy results. Neil Komesar describes the importance
of institutional choice analysis in his book, Imperfect Alternatives as follows:

See The Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Pub. L. 107-204.30 July 2002. Stat. 745.
See William Ide, "Post-Enron Corporate Governance Opportunities: Creating a Culture of Greater
Board Collaboration and Oversight," Mercer Law Review, 54 (2003): 829; see also Larry E. Ribstein,
"Bubble Laws," Houston Law Review, 40 (2003): 88-89; see also U.S. Chamber of Commerce, "U.S.
2

Chamber of Commerce on Swift Conference Action, Corporate Reform Impacts Not Well Understood,"
http://www.uschamber.com/press/reieases/2002/julyl02-120.htm .

1
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Goal choice and institutional choice are both essential for law and public policy.
They are inextricably related. On the one hand institutional performance and,
therefore, institutional choice cannot be assessed except against the benchmark of
some social goal or set of goals. On the other, because in the abstract any goal can
be consistent with a wide range of public policies, the decision as to who decides
[on the specifics of the policy] determines how a goal shapes public policy. It is
institutional choice that connects goals with their legal or public policy results. 3

Discussions limited to social goals have generated useful public policy analysis. This
paper strives to demonstrate that successfully protecting investors by regulating auditing
depends as much upon the capacity, competency, and impartiality of the institution
charged with the task as it does upon the goal. Donald Schwartz notes that "federal
influence on corporate governance could be enhanced either through action by Congress,
the regulatory agencies, or the courtS.,,4 The body of this paper utilizes a comparative
institutional choice analysis of the decision-making processes and allocations of
responsibility found within Congress, the SEC, and the federal judiciary to understand
how regulation of financial statement issuances is initiated, and how selection of the
optimal institution is possible in light of a clearly defined regulatory objective.
Comparative institutional choice analysis offers a number of advantages over
analysis of a single institution. The foremost is a framework that captures the significant
and controversial decision about who will shape the contours of the law. With a singular
See Neil Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), 1994,5.
See Mark J. Roe, "Delaware's Competition," Harvard Law Review, 117 (2003): 598-99; See also
Donald E. Schwartz, "Federalism and Corporate Governance," Ohio State Law Journal, 45 (1984): 571.
4

2

.,

·

"

institutional focus, this decision is treated superficially or, at best, analyzed in terms of
the attributes of only one institution. 5 A comparative framework for institutional choice,
on the other hand, makes a parallel comparison of how the institutional decision is made
for each institutional alternative. Participant-centered comparative institutional choice
compares the costs and benefits of participant action in each of the available institutions.
This comparison enhances the understanding of previous institutional choices, and
predicts future institutional choices.
The second most significant advantage of comparative institutional choice
analysis over single institutional analysis is that it flushes out the institutional strengths
and weaknesses that lead to good and bad policy outcomes. The economic theory of
public policy highlights resource allocation efficiency as the overriding determinant of
policy success. Some analysts have argued against the social goal of efficient resource
allocation, preferring to measure a policy's success with concepts such as Rawlsian
justice or Lockean protection of property. By focusing solely on normative and
descriptive arguments about social goals, policy analysts fail to link social goals to policy
results. 6 Sometimes bad policies emerge from good social goals. The attributes of the
institution chosen to regulate often affect policy results as much as the qualities of the
goal that is pursued. The rule-centered framework for comparative institutional choice
describes the abilities of several institutions to regulate a clearly defined rule in a given
area of the law. In this way, rule-centered institutional choice connects social goals, no
matter what they are, to policy outcomes, and assists policy analysts in deciding which
institution is optimal for a specific rule.

6

See Neil Komesar, supra note 3,4-5.
Ibid.
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Finally, comparative institutional choice fortifies policy analysis against the
notion that institutional choice is intuitively obvious. The intuitive approach undermines
the importance of observing variations of ability among institutional alternatives.
Institutional alternatives are often intuitively dismissed by a parade of horribles because
they are not consistent with the analyst's policy position. Comparative institutional
choice, on the other hand, emphasizes the argument that any social goal is consistent with
a wide range of public policies from a variety of institutions. Choosing the best institution
often means choosing from a list of imperfect alternatives. 7
Although both the participant-centered and the rule-centered approach to
comparative institutional choice are designed to operate individually, this paper combines
them to form a multi-step comparative institutional choice analysis. The combined
framework provides more insight because it allows the analyst to investigate institutional
choice at two stages of policy development: initiation and regulation. It is proposed that
the participant-centered approach is most useful during initiation, when the participation
of mass actors determines which institution is preferred. The institution chosen by policy
initiators, however, is not necessarily the optimal one for regulation. Rule-centered
comparisons are more effective in determining the optimal institution to create the
proposed rule.
Congress mandated broad reform in many different areas of corporate governance
with SOX. The efficacy of the law is most forcefully discussed by focusing on the
sections reforming the process of auditing financial disclosures. Because investors rely
heavily on financial statement information for economic decision-making, regulating
financial statement audits is central to achieving the goal of protecting investors. With
7

See Neil Komesar, supra note 4,22-23.

4

comparative institutional choice, an economic analysis of audit-related rules is enriched
and suggestions for future regulatory action in a variety of areas are thoughtfully
constructed. 8
Focusing on how institutions interact with and control financial statement auditors
establishes the framework for analyzing participant-centered factors involved in initiating
audit regulation. This paper focuses on one area of corporate governance reform
addressed by

sox: regulation of non-audit services provided by auditors (found in

Section 201 of SOX). References to particular sections of SOX are made to create a
context for comparative purposes, not to critique the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Before institutional choice analysis is described in detail, the first section of this
paper discusses the role of auditors in financial statement disclosure. Section II explains
institutional choice in the context of audit regulation and identifies the premises of the
participation-centered and rule-centered models of institutional choice analysis. Section
III describes the combined framework of the institutional choice analysis in the context of
audit reform. Section IV provides an example of comparative institutional choice analysis
for audit services regulation. A conclusion on the optimal institutional choice for audit
reform and future research ideas are offered in Section V to add another perspective to
the debate over SOX appropriateness and efficacy.

I.

The Audit Function

A description of the audit function is provided to focus this discussion on the most
important aspects of a complex profession. These aspects are: that auditors act as
independent evaluators of accounting information that is transmitted from businesses to
See Komesar, supra note 3, 7.

5

investors and creditors, that the goals of the audit procedure have been uniquely defined
by the AICP A, and that, despite their focus on examining informational evidence,
auditors face ethical decisions.
The audit of financial statements is an assurance service provided by certified
public accountants for economic decision makers. Decision makers include purchasers
and sellers of goods and services, business managers, investors, and creditors. For each of
these parties, relevant, reliable information is critical to making decisions that take
advantage of opportunities presented by a competitive market. 9 The SEC requires all
registered public companies to follow prescribed guidelines on the issuance of financial
statements to ensure that such information is provided to investors.
Three actors are involved in the issuance of financial statements: corporate
management, the audit committee, and the independent auditor. Management produces
financial statements, the audit committee oversees the financial reporting, and auditors
opine on the fairness of the financial assertions made by management in the financial
statements.
The demand for complex, remote information begets the audit practice.
Transactions in market economies are numerous and complicated, and most decision
makers are not able to collect and summarize key information. Information professionals,
such as auditors, transform complex information into straightforward reports for decision
makers.
Because investment decisions often result in the commitment of significant
economic resources, decision makers demand trustworthy information.

9
10

10

Auditors test the

See Louwers , et aI., Auditing and Assurance Services, (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005), 2-4.
See Louwers , et aI., supra note 8, 7.
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accounting information that is generated by management and report an opinion to the
public on the fairness of the information. According to Ernst and Young CEO James
Turley, independent auditors "audit the company's financial statements to test
management's assertions as to the accuracy and fair presentation of the financial
statements before they are issued."ll To do this, auditors acquire specialized knowledge
of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) developed by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and Statements on Auditing Standards issued by
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). The FASB is independent
of the accounting profession, the AICPA is comprised of accounting professionals. Both
are monitored by the SEC, which has delegated rulemaking authority to the organized
accounting profession under the Exchange Act of 1934. 12 The cornerstone of the public's
trust that an auditor has used his best judgment to make audit choices is the auditor's
independence. 13
The concept of auditor independence develops over time. Auditor independence
in the 20 th century began as a state-of-mind in which the auditor would take the
perspective of the business owner. In the 1930's, auditors abandoned the practice of
taking on the interests of owners, and independence came to mean neutrality of interest.
For the next seven decades, neutrality was implemented by commitment to AICPA

11
See James Turley. The Senate Housing, Banking and Urban Affairs Committee, "Sarbanes-Oxley
Act Impact International Convergence," Sept. 9, 2004. http://web.lexisnexis.com/congcomp/document?_m=95941568976c918d867 a2b5bab5560 10&_docnum= 1&wchp=dGLb V
Iz-zSkSA& md5=bec867439bdea319cc8dlb198badI000.
12
See Louwers , et aI., supra note 8; see also Anne M. Khademian, "The Securities and Exchange
Commission: A Small Regulatory Agency with a Gargantuan Challenge," Public Administration Review,
62 (2002): 5.
13
See Deborah Lindberg, "Before and After Enron: CPA's Views on Auditor Independence," The
CPA Journal, (2004): 36.
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standards. 14 The private sector Independence Standards Board was, until SOX, the
AICPA-sponsored, authoritative source of audit independence standards.
Auditor independence is linked to investor protection because it promotes reliable
information and efficient markets. This paper is not concerned with whether the
provisions created by the AICP A are better than those created by Congress in SOX, but
with whether Congress is the optimal institution for setting independence standards.
Independence does not require the auditor to be completely free from all
influence. The independent auditor need only be free from factors that rise to the level of
compromising the ability to make unbiased audit decisions. For example, management
pays the auditor's fee, so complete independence is impossible.I 5 As independence
develops from a state-of-mind into a commitment to standards, the concepts of
independence in fact and independence in appearance are the auditors' guide for deciding
which factors compromise their independence.
Independent in fact means that the auditor can make independent audit decisions
even if there is a perceived lack of independence or if the auditor is placed in a
potentially compromising position. 16 For example, an auditor who is independent in fact
will continue to make objective assessments of GAAP fairness even when client
management has pressured him to conceal a fraud.
Even when an auditor is independent in fact, the public may not believe that the
auditor is independent. Appearing to lack independence creates skepticism over the value
of the audit opinion. For instance, an auditor that holds stock in the company she audits
appears to lack independence even though she may perform the audit with complete
14
15
16

See Robert Colson, "CPA Independence, Present and Future," The CPA Journal, (2004): 80.
See Lindberg, supra note 13: 36.
See Lindberg, supra note 13: 38.

8

independence in fact. Because investors have no way to evaluate independence in fact,
appearing independent is as important to the auditor's credibility as is acting independent.
The Auditing Standards Board of the AICP A addresses independence in appearance by
directing the auditor to consider whether a "reasonable investor knowing all the facts and
circumstances" would believe that a particular factor would compromise the auditor's
independence. 17

II.

Institutional Choice

Institutional choice is a decision-making process in which politicians, legislators,
judges, interest groups, and the public consider the abilities of the various regulatory
bodies that can legislate, promulgate, or order a proposed rule. 18 Comparative
institutional choice is more useful than single institutional choice because it focuses on
the controversial decision of who decides, flushes out institutional strengths and
weaknesses, and dismisses the notion that institutional choice is intuitive. Comparative
institutional choice analysis requires a framework that compares parallel attributes across
institutions and detects variations in institutional ability in a variety of circumstances
because institutions come in a diversity of shapes and sizes, each uniquely complex.

19

Parallel attributes include: the benefits and costs of participant action, institutional
capacity, institutional competence, and institutional impartiality. The participants studied
in this paper are the actors involved in issuing financial disclosures: corporate executives,
audit committees, and independent auditors, and the general investing public. The
institutions analyzed in this paper are Congress, the SEC, and the federal judiciary.
17
See Independence Standards Board, "A Framework for Auditor Independence, "Discussion
Memorandum 00-1, Feb. 2000, http://www.cpaindependence.org.
18
See Joan MacLeod Heminway, "Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for Federal
Corporate Governance Initiatives," Fordham Journal o/Corporate and Financial Law, (2005) "pending".
19
See Neil Komesar, supra note 4, 7.

9

Institutional choice needs to be explained more thoroughly in the context of audit
regulation because SOX is a landmark growth of federal participation in the regulation of
auditing and disclosing financial statements. The Act is certain to increase the
participation of federal courts in corporate governance by creating new areas of federal
jurisdiction. Congress passed specific rules in SOX that define corporate executives'
liability, define audit committee duties, and regulate non-audit services provided by
auditors. In addition, Congress created a new institution, the Public Company Accounting
and Oversight Board (PCAOB), to take sole responsibility for setting audit standards. For
auditors, the creation PCAOB abruptly ends decades of self-regulation through the
AICPA. Joan MacLeod Heminway describes the enactment of SOX as "a forceful,
preemptive use of institutional choice on the part of Congress.,,20
Although SOX represents a new era in the development of the concept of
independence, this paper does not question the creation of new audit standards or
PCAOB. The focus of this analysis is on the process by which regulatory reform comes
to a particular institution's agenda, and the abilities of institutional alternatives to create
the desired regulation. As such, the setting of this analysis is during the six-months when
the public became aware of frauds at Enron, Worldcom, and Xerox, and rule proponents
had not yet made an institutional choice. The analysis compares institutional factors that
led to specific developments during the initiation and formulation of SOX. In the future,
the PCAOB should be included as an alternative institutional choice. At this point,
however, the PCAOB is maturing, and a body of literature on its abilities is not available.
Without a cohesive framework, the three-part analysis becomes confusing, the
comparison of parallel factors becomes more difficult, and the variations between
20

Joan MacLeod Heminway, supra note 18: 5.

10

institutions, which are often very close in ability, become indistinguishable 21 . This paper
combines the participant-centered model found in Neil Komesar's book, Imperfect
Alternatives, with the rule-centered framework found in Joan MacLeod Heminway's
article "Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for Federal Corporate
Governance Initiatives.,,22
Komesar's participant-centered approach is designed to be "portable"; it can
detect "variations in institutional ability across the wide and varied landscape of law and
public policy.,,23 Like the rule-centered model, it is comparative. The comparative
approach is preferred because it provides details about variations of institutional ability
that are essential for deciding which institution is optimal for a given area of regulation.
The primary difference between the participant-centered approach and the rule-centered
approach is the starting point for the analysis. Participant-centered institutional choice
"identifies the actions of participants as the factor that in general best accounts for the
variation in how institutions function.,,24 Komesar treats political and adjudicative
rulemaking like a market of buyers and sellers. The participant-centered approach focuses
on how actors will alter their participation based on the costs and benefits of their action
or inaction. The avid participation of small groups or apathy of large groups can create
institutional biases. Studying these biases in the context of audit regulations is useful for
making and predicting institutional choices.

21
22
23
24

See Neil Komesar, supra note 4, 4-5.
See Joan MacLeod Heminway, supra note 18.
See Neil Komesar, supra note 4, 6-13.
Ibid., 7.
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Heminway's rule-centered approach begins by focusing on a clearly defined rule
to assess institutional strengths and weaknesses relative to that rule. 25 The rule-centered
model is best applied when there is a consensus about the need to regulate. In this way,
Heminway's model is an extension of Komesar's. Komesar's model seeks to understand
the actions of participants who bring issues to rulemaking institutions' agendas and
evaluate the responses of those institutions. He describes how the factors affecting the
initiation of rulemaking also affect policy outcomes. Heminway's model provides the
tools for comparing institutional alternatives once the issue has been raised and choosing
the optimal institution. She deals with the specific institutional abilities that enhance or
worsen policy outcomes.

III.

The Combined Framework for Comparative Institutional Choice Analysis
This paper proposes that comparative institutional choice is improved by

combining the participant-centered and rule-centered models. The combined framework
uses each model for the stage of policy development that it is best suited to describe. The
participant-centered model discusses policy initiation. The rule-centered model is used to
compare institutional capacity and competence during policy formulation.
The multi-step approach of the combined framework has advantages over the use
of only the participant-centered or rule-centered model. Because public policy is created
in multiple steps, the factors that influence institutional choice decisions vary in
importance depending on when the analyst uses a given model. For instance, while the
high cost of legal information is a critical factor when a rule proponent is at the stage of
initiating regulation, it is not as important as judicial expertise for determining whether
the resulting policy achieves resource allocation efficiency. Standing alone, the
25

See Joan MacLeod Heminway, supra note 18: 6.

12

,.
participant-centered and rule-centered models are limited in their ability to track
variations of important factors through multiple steps. When combined, the participantcentered and rule-centered models reinforce each other's weaknesses.
In Imperfect Altemati ves, Komesar acknowledges that "the strengths and
weaknesses of one institution versus another vary from one set of circumstances to
another.,,26 The participant model, however, limits its comparative investigation of such
circumstances to factors that inhibit or promote participation from certain massive
groups. These factors mainly determine how and where policy is initiated. Constraining
analysis to participant factors results in a policy analysis that offers little information on
the inherent abilities of legislatures, agencies, or courts. Although an emphasis on
participants isolates the ways in which various institutions respond to participants, it
ignores the ways in which other inherent institutional abilities, such as authority, shape
the resulting policy. As the area of proposed regulation becomes more complex, inherent
institutional abilities become more important. This premise is ostensible given the
creation of expert regulatory agencies such as the SEC.
The rule-centered approach increases the scope of institutional choice analysis to
provide parallel comparison of inherent institutional abilities that is not limited to
participant interaction. To do this, it must replace an emphasis on participants with an
emphasis on well-defined rules. The rule-centered approach treats institutional bias as
one of many institutional attributes that varies depending on the specifics of the proposed
rule. Biases, however, refer to how an institution treats groups of people, not rules.
Congress, for instance, might be said to exhibit a bias to

dom~stic

producers when they

increase tariffs on imports. The federal courts on the other hand are designed to operate
26

See Neil Komesar, supra note 4.
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with less bias because domestic manufacturing lobbies cannot influence judges'
decisions. The rule-centered model's analysis of bias is based on the premise that certain
groups of people are linked to certain types of rule proposals. In reality, particular groups
of participants initiate rules in areas they traditionally ignore as perceived stakes
increase. 27 As such, the rule-centered model is less skillful at comparing institutional
behavior variances due to biases and participant stakes.
A second limitation of the rule-centered model is comparison of instances in
which a proposed rule has already been clearly defined. A clearly defined rule is usually
developed by an institution after an initial institutional choice is made. For this reason,
this paper focuses on participant factors to understand policy initiation, and proceeds to
discussing inherent institutional abilities during a second stage: policy formulation. Once
participant and rule-centered factors are compared among Congress, the SEC, the federal
judiciary, an example of audit regulation is presented to exhibit the multi-step combined
framework.
A.

The Participant Factors that Affect Policy Initiation

In the context of regulating the issuance of audited financial statements, the
participants are: investors, corporate executives, auditors, audit committees, legislators,
judges, officials in the SEC, and members of self-regulating organizations like the
AICPA. This list of participants illustrates the complexity of institutional choice. To
make comparison simpler, Komesar emphasizes the "activities of consumers, producers,
voters, lobbyists, and litigants,,28. In the context of this paper, these five groups can be
condensed into two: investors, who are consumers, voters, and potential plaintiffs, and

27

See Neil Komesar, supra note 4, 79-85.

28

Ibid., 7.
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the actors involved in the issuance of financial statements (corporate executives, audit
committees, and auditors), who are suppliers, lobbyists, and potential defendants. The
official actors in the rule making process - legislators, members of the SEC, and judges playa secondary role in policy initiation. Although analyzing the behavior of individual
judges and members of Congress can provide insight into institutional comparison during
rulemaking, the activity of massive groups of actors have a stronger affect on institutional
behavior when rulemaking is being initiated. 29
The participant-centered comparative institutional choice model analyzes the
activities of mass actors through the Two-Force Model, a theory that broadens the scope
of Interest Group Theory of Politics (IGTP). According to the IGTP, concentrated
minority interest groups have greater access to and influence over the regulatory process
than majority groups. Komesar argues that IGTP "places almost exclusive emphasis on
overrepresentation of concentrated interests, usually at the expense of larger, less
organized groups.,,30 Although the republican principle exhibited by the United States'
government guards against wanton ruling passions of numerical majorities, majorities
gain strength and even overcome minorities as the factors used by the IGTP to describe
minority dominance are reversed. That is, as issues become less complex, majority stakes
increase per capita, and low cost information becomes widely available, majority
interests can exert a countervailing force on minority interests.

31

The Two Force Model

allows analysts to examine the tradeoff between the minoritarian interest of business
lobbyist and the majoritarian influence of the investing public.

29
30
31

Ibid.
Ibid., 54.
Ibid., 70.
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Institutional choice analysts, whether assessing participation in Congress, the
SEC, or the federal courts, must begin their comparison with how each institution deals
with skewed distribution of stakes, in which one interest has higher per capita stakes and
fewer members. If an institution gives favor or denies recognition to a group in the
presence of skewed distribution of stakes, a bias exists. Komesar identifies minoritarian
biases as occurrences when "a concentrated high per capita minority prevails ... even
though the total social costs imposed on the majority are greater than the total social
benefits gained by the successful minority.,,32 Majoritarian bias, on the other hand, is an
instance in which the maj ority has their way even though the total social impact on the
majority is less than the impact on the minority.
Description of the participant-centered factors that detect variations in
institutional performance is not complete without a discussion of goal choice. Komesar
points out that "the normative implications of the two-force model and, therefore,
characterizations like majoritarian or minoritarian bias can (but do not necessarily) vary
with the choice of goal.,,33 If the chosen goal is resource allocation efficiency, then
minoritarian biases threaten to exploit the majority. With a different goal, such as the
protection of private property rights from the government, minoritarian biases are less
threatening. 34
The comparative institutional choice analyst must ask: what is the appropriate
social goal for audit regulation? Protecting investors by improving the reliability of
financial disclosures has been the explicit goal of securities and disclosure regulation
since the Exchange Act of 1934. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 reiterates this goal.
32
33

34

See Neil Komesar, supra note 4, 76.
Ibid., 80
Ibid,79-80.
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Protection here refers to guarding investor capital against fraudulent disclosures. In a
sense, the Exchange Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act protect investors, a majoritarian
group, from corporations, a minoritarian group. But investor protection is not the ultimate
goal of audit regulation. If it were, a strong majoritarian dominance would lead to
overzealous regulation that unnecessarily saps corporate resources. Maintaining efficient
markets by ensuring consistent transparency of information is the ultimate goal of audit
regulation. Market efficiency is akin to resource allocation efficiency. Corporations
should be forced only to provide levels of disclosure that are not so expensive that the
total cost to corporations outweighs the total benefit to users of financial statements. A
major challenge to all institutions, therefore, is determining how investors and creditors
use audited disclosures and whether audit regulation is an effective means maintaining
efficient markets. Not only must an institution know about investors' use of disclosures,
but it should be able to reasonably infer how much overall benefit certain types of audit
regulations contribute to efficient markets. This paper does not draw conclusions on how
audit regulations contribute to efficient markets. Instead, it seeks to compare the factors
that explain why certain institutions are better or worse at drawing such conclusions.

B.

Comparing the Participant-Centered Factors among Congress, the SEC, and
the Federal Judiciary
When comparing Congress, the SEC, and the federal judiciary, the policy analyst

must consider how each institution reacts to majoritarian and minoritarian influence in
light of regulating auditors with the goal of maintaining efficient markets. First, the
compared framework defines who can participate and the degree of their influence. Then
participation costs are compared among institutions to predict which institution actors
prefer.
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1.

Two Forces of Influence

Compared to the SEC and the federal courts, Congress is, by electoral design,
more susceptible to majoritarian influence. Majoritarian influences, though less likely to
create biases than their minoritarian counterpart, are exerted on Congress by voters. As
such, Congress is expected to be more sensitive to majority interests when elections are
imminent. The media plays a role in this phenomenon by providing cheap and accessible
information to otherwise dormant majorities. 35 Without extensive media coverage of a
politicized issue near an election, Congress tends to exhibit minoritarian biases more
often in the context of audit regulation. The American Bar Association, Chamber of
Commerce, Business Roundtable, AICPA, and the Big Four accounting firms have been
historically successful at influencing Congress. The SEC also lobbies Congress to draft
legislation that falls outside of the agency's explicit authority but has impacts on the
SEC's regulatory goals nonetheless. The Chairman of the SEC influences Congress by
speaking about issues that the agency would like to be regulated. The courts influence
Congress by judicial review and case selection.
The SEC is less affected by majoritarian influences than Congress because agency
members are not elected. Congress can pass on majoritarian biases to the SEC by
changing the agency's funding or exerting political pressure on agency members. 36 This
makes the SEC more susceptible to majoritarian influence than the federal courts.
Minorities exert greater influence on the SEC than majorities. Minority groups do not
influence the SEC to the same degree as they do Congress. Minority interests influence
the SEC in two ways. They exert influence directly by sending members of regulated
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industries to consult with the SEC (controlling information) and indirectly through
Congress. 37 Just prior to the exposure of fraud at Enron, business interest groups lobbied
Congress and blocked rules from the SEC that were aimed at prohibiting auditors from
providing non-audit services. The federal courts can influence the SEC by creating rules
in areas of agency authority and review agency actions. Both these methods of influence
are limited by the federal courts deference to agency decisions. 38
In general, the federal courts are not greatly influenced by majoritarian or
minoritarian interests. 39 With the exception of bribes, the public can exert very little
influence over the action of the courts except by filing suits. Likewise, Congress and the
SEC do not exert much influence over the judiciary. Congress can influence the federal
court system by legislatively defining court jurisdiction in certain matters, exercising its
right to approve judicial appointments, and controlling the budget for court resources. 40
The influence of Congress over the judiciary is counterbalanced by judiciary's power to
review Congressional action. The SEC influences the court by exercising its authority to
bring action in federal courts. According to Heminway, this power enables the SEC to
"push the boundaries of ill-defined areas of the law in directions that suit its own
parochial regulatory interest. ,,41

2.

The Costs of Participation

Given the complexities of modem political action in democracies, assuming
dominance by concentrated minorities in Congress and the SEC has become second
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42

This section provides only general analysis about the participation of

minoritarian and majoritarian groups. The details of these groups' behavior in the context
of audit regulation are born out by the example of comparative institutional choice in
section IV.
Comparative analysis of the benefits and costs of participation in political
processes focuses on factors that cause variation in the degree to which the few dominate
the many. Political results are rarely caused by battles in which the largest group wins
simply because of their numbers. Although voting gives majority groups a potential edge,
this potential is rarely realized without special circumstances. Free riders are the primary
challenge to overcoming minority dominance is in terms of both benefits and costs. On
the benefit side, distribution of per capita stakes is the key factor for predicting political
inaction. On the cost side, the cost of information is the foremost factor leading to free
riders.
The likelihood of political inaction by majority groups can be predicted by
observing two aspects of the distribution of per capita stakes. First, higher average per
capita stakes among members of the majority make it more likely it is that the majority
group will incur the basic expenses to understand their position. 43 Majority groups
characterized by very low per capita stakes get away with free riding because free riders
are difficult to isolate among a large, uninterested group. Even when a majority group's
average per capita stakes are relatively low compared to a minority group, an increase in
stakes will wake a dormant majority. Second, greater heterogeneity among majority
groups increases the likelihood that small, high per capita stakes subgroups will take
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action on behalf of the majority.44 The existence of pockets of high-benefit subgroups is
indicated by skewness and variation of per capita stakes among majority groups.
Costs work in tandem with benefits to determine the likelihood of political
inaction by majority groups. The cost of information increases as issues become more
complex and extensive. Information costs include: identifying a basic interest in an issue,
acquiring knowledge about the issue, recognizing one's political position, organizing
collective action, and becoming sophisticated with the various channels of political
influence. Without pockets of high-benefit subgroups to stimulate action, it is unlikely
that a majority groups will expend resources to understand issues and organize for
political action. 45 Even with catalytic subgroups, majority groups are unlikely to identify
their basic interest in an issue when average per capita stakes are low. In sum, political
action by majority groups becomes more likely as average per capita stakes increase,
issues become simpler, and pockets of catalytic high-benefit subgroups develop.
Concentrated minority interest groups, on the other hand, are characterized by
substantial per capita stakes. They have an incentive to understand issues, organize for
political action, and develop sophistication with the various channels of political
influence. These groups form lobbies, contribute to campaigns, and manipulate the media
to influence Congress and the SEC. The cost of overcoming free riding for minority
interest groups is mitigated by closeness of members (in terms of stakes and identified
political position), benefits of action, and obviousness of free riding due to smaller
numbers.
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Participation in the federal judiciary is also understood in terms of distribution of
stakes and the cost of information. In the courts, the benefits and costs realized by
plaintiffs and defendants are analyzed. Litigants are characterized by uniform low stakes
(resembling two dispersed majorities), uniform high stakes (resembling two concentrated
minorities), and skewed distribution (resembling a trade-off between minority and
majority). No matter the distribution of benefits, the cost of information in the federal
judiciary is high due to institutional formalities and complexity in the judicial process.
Litigation of almost any issue requires a lawyer to speak the language of the court and
deal with the mechanics of litigation with sophistication. Understanding and using
judicial rulings is also costly for participants.
When both sides of an issue have uniform low stakes, neither is likely to litigate
because of the cost. Potential plaintiffs and defendants in this case are both widely
dispersed, increasing the probability of inaction. 46 Various instances of non-point
pollution, where both victims and polluters are widespread provide a familiar example of
highly dispersed, uniform low stakes.
When stakes are uniformly high between potential plaintiffs and potential
defendants, litigation is more likely but action is not a foregone conclusion. High-stakes
parties tend to utilize cheaper market alternatives to avoid litigation. High-stakes
adversaries are sophisticated enough to work out differences by negotiating contractual
relationships or settlements outside of COurt. 47 For instance, if Coca Cola threatened to
sue Pepsi for stealing and using their patented secret recipe, lawyers from each side are
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more likely to recognize that settling outside of court is cheaper and design a settlement
that pleases both parties.
The probability of litigation in cases of skewed distribution of stakes depends
upon which side is dispersed and which side is concentrated. Class actions increase the
likelihood of litigation when stakes are dispersed among plaintiffs and concentrated
among defendants. In this scenario, class actions reduce per capita litigation expense for
plaintiffs by pooling resources. If stakes are extremely dispersed among a very large
group of potential plaintiffs, preventing catalytic subgroups, litigation is less likely
because potential plaintiffs do not recognize the injury or availability of class action
recovery. When stakes are dispersed among many defendants and concentrated among
plaintiffs, on the contrary, litigation becomes less likely because of the prohibitive cost of
suing many defendants. Class action rules do not cater to suits from concentrated
plaintiffs against dispersed defendants because controlling thousands of defendants is
costly and awkward. 48
As the preceding general analysis shows, variations in distribution of stakes and
information costs among majority and minority groups determine participant action
during policy initiation. In general, majoritarian groups with low per capita stakes are
dominated by concentrated minoritarian interest groups. Minorities have more to gain by
meeting the costs of policy initiation. Majorities become more active as stakes increase
and information costs decrease. This trend is more evident in Conges and the SEC in the
federal judiciary because political institutions are geared to meet voter and interest group
needs. Courts are less accessible because they require expensive legal interpreters and
operate at remote locations.
48
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It is by becoming sophisticated with the channels of influence that concentrated
interest groups transform influence into bias. High per capita stakes curtails free riding
among members of minoritarian groups. The cost of political organization is less
daunting to minoritarian groups because, once a threshold cost is borne, marginal cost is
unaffected. Minority groups that are already organized, such as corporations and
professional organizations, have a lobbying and fundraising advantage. 49 A majoritarian
bias, on the other hand, results from voting. Congress caters the most to active majorities,
the SEC receives indirect influence from Congresses' majority biases, and the federal
courts only offer advantages to majorities with class actions.

C.

Rule-centered Factors that Affect Policy Form ulation

The abilities of Congress, the SEC, and the federal judiciary to make clearly
defined audit regulation are assessed by comparing the institutions' capacity and
competence. This section elaborates on the rule-centered factors by defining these
attributes.
1.

Institutional Capacity

Institutional capacity is a measure of the legislative power of Congress, the
regulatory authority of the SEC, and the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The concept of
capacity is primarily used to eliminate institutions that do not have the power to make a
particular type of rule, not to determine which institution will optimally formulate a rule.
The following three paragraphs describe the power of Congress, the SEC, and the federal
judiciary to make rules that control the behavior of the auditors.
In general, Congress has functional rulemaking authority as the legislative branch
of government. The Commerce Clause of the Constitution gives Congress power to
49
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investigate, delegate, and regulate foreign and interstate commerce. 50 About disclosure
laws, Robert Thompson and Hillary Sale note that "disclosure has become the most
important method to regulate corporate managers, and disclosure has been predominantly
a federal, rather than a state, methodology.,,51 Although states have traditionally
dominated the rulemaking process for duties and liabilities of corporate executives and
boards, Congress is paying more attention to corporate executives and members of
corporate boards, such as audit committees. Thompson and Sale argue that federal
litigation over the fiduciary duty of board members is increasingly popular because of
several practical advantages of the federal courts. These authors also note that increasing
th

use of the federal courts for shareholder litigation in the 20 century makes the federal
legislature increasingly aware their power over disclosure rules. 52
The SEC's authority over audit regulation is not derived from the Constitution.

53

The nature and scope of the SEC's power is set by Congress and is subject to
Congressional override. Its authority is subsidiary to Congress, but it is active as a
corporate regulator. The Exchange Act of 1934 created the SEC to administer, interpret,
and enforce securities laws within the Act. The most notable area of SEC regulation in
corporate governance is proxy regulation, but the Exchange Act also allows the agency to
promulgate disclosure provisions to protect investors. 54 By regulating disclosures, the
SEC controls the behavior of corporate management, audit committees, and auditors.
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The rule-making power of the federal judiciary over auditors is Constitutional.
The courts can create or alter such rules in the context of cases under federal securities
laws or interpretations of state law in cases of diversity jurisdiction. 55 In this way, courts
are able to increase federalization of corporate governance laws by eliminating state
provisions. Because corporations with securities traded on national markets are exempt
from state class actions, litigants generally prefer to bring anti-fraud class actions to the
federal court. 56 A number of such suits were filed following the exposure of fraud at
Enron.

2.

Institutional Competence

Analysts draw certain conclusions about institutional competence primarily by
observing structure. Structural competencies are rooted in the separation of powers in the
federal government. Institutions are most often more competent at tasks that they are
designed to handle. Structural competence is discussed in terms of the deliberative,
accessible, and representative features of institutions. Although analysts can draw
conclusions by observing another type of competence, substantive competence, structural
competency is more important. Substantive competence (expertise) is fleeting. It depends
on the abilities of particular members of each institution at a given time. Talented
members do not stay forever; structure is more permanent. Furthermore, substantive
competence relies on anecdotal observations that tend to result in intuitive institutional
choices that value tradition over institutional merit. For instance, because the SEC has a
long history of regulating securities trading, the agency might be intuitively chosen based
upon supposed substantive competence. If, hypothetically, the agency can not retain the
55
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most talented employees because it is under funded the promise of expertise might not
come to fruition. Over reliance on substantive competence is a rule-centered weakness
that is eliminated from the combined framework.
There are several structural aspects of Congress that enable legislators to
competently regulate auditors. In Congress, a deliberative, routine method of policy
formulation is coupled with broad investigative powers that allow representatives to
become fully informed. For issues of complexity, such as audit and financial disclosure
reform, Congress uses special committees and relies on staff assistance to enhance
overall understanding of policy issues. Representatives' knowledge is espoused in
debates and applied in sessions of laborious bill amending. The involved nature of federal
legislation, though it leads to thoroughness, can prove a detriment structural competence
when rulemaking is slowed by too much deliberation.
Compared to the SEC and the federal judiciary, Congress provides unparalleled
access to participants. Voting encourages legislators to aggressively pursue desires of
influential groups. To ensure that this occurs, legislative action is public and open, which
ensures accountability. 57
Congress certainly derives some legitimacy from their structure because members
form an assembly that is representative of the public. 58 Congress' ability to make rules in
the public interest is only structurally limited by the existence of channels through which
minority interest groups exert influence and create bias.
Like Congress, the SEC gains structural competence from a deliberative routine
of regulation. The steps involved in promulgating federal agency rules are less varied,
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cumbersome, and involved than the federal legislative process. 59 The SEC even has the
option of issuing interpretations and informal rules, making the agency's rulemaking
more nimble.
The Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 requires agencies to provide notice of
proposed rulemaking and access to the public for comments. The SEC is accessible, but
not to the same extent as Congress. A design that is less responsive to voter opinion
shields the SEC from the direct pressure of majoritarian biases, although Congress can
indirectly pass biases to agencies. 6o The public can petition the SEC for rule adoption,
alteration, and repeal, but this process is likely to be most useful to well organized
minoritarian groups, and does not make the agency truly representative.
Because members of the SEC are appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Senate, they are only indirectly representative. The SEC achieves further
independence as the President cannot remove its leadership once appointed. 61
Independence is important to the SEC's structural competence because it allows the
agency to develop viewpoints on public policy that are not influenced by the legislative
or executive branch.
The structure of the federal courts affords judges more independence than
members of Congress and the SEC, but results in rulemaking that is "less deliberative,
less representative, and less accessible than that of either Congress or the SEC.,,62 Marcel
Kahan and Edward Rock support this characterization, noting that "judges are brought to
the fore through the decentralized activities of private actors rather than on their own
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motion, [and] lack the power and staff to conduct investigations.,,63 Deliberation among
federal judges is limited because they receive less input than Congress or the SEC, and
their decisions are limited to the facts of individual cases. This means that judicial rules
are made retrospectively in response to claims of participants. Congressional legislation
and SEC promulgations, alternatively, are prospective e.g. made ex ante. 64 A structure
that permits only retrospective rulemaking limits the competence of the judiciary because
retrospective rules solve problems particular to a set of facts. Prospective rulemaking, on
the other hand, lends itself to creating comprehensive regulation. The process of appeal is
another structural variable that affects judicial deliberation. Judges at different levels of
the appeals process resolve conflicts by different means. Supreme Court justices are the
only judges who can deliberate to resolve conflicts in a uniform manner.65
Access to the federal courts during policy formulation is limited to individuals
who bring suits. The federal judiciary only provides access to non-litigants under special
circumstances, i.e. the allowance of amicus briefs. 66 Access to the judiciary is also
limited by the size and complexity of its bureaucracy. If willing to bear the information
costs, groups can gain access to judicial policy because rulings become public record.
Like members of the SEC, judges are indirectly representative because they are
appointed by the President and approved by Congress. Judges, however, are appointed
for life, making them far more independent than members of the SEC.
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accountable to higher levels of appellate review. The actions of the Supreme Court,
however, are not reviewable.

IV.

Comparative Institutional Choice Analysis for Regulating Non-audit Services
Provided by Auditors
After fraud was exposed at Enron, the government made a historical indictment of

Anderson LLP, Enron's independent auditor. Anderson compromised independence of
appearance by selling lucrative, non-audit consulting services to Enron. The nature of
consulting, which is aimed at improving financial performance, conflicts with the
objective, investigatory nature of auditing. Anderson did not maintain independence in
fact because of the intense economic bond formed by lucrative consulting fees. Partners
at Anderson overlooked fraud at Enron as an auditor to ensure that, as a consultant, they
could continue to garner phenomenal revenues. Anderson was not indicted for violating
fiduciary duty, however. Providing consulting services to audit clients was not illegal in
2000. They were indicted and convicted of obstruction of justice during an investigation
of fraud at Enron. The combined framework begins by examining the stakes of investors
and audit firms and describes a shift from dominance by the few to dominance by the
many.
The participants in audit regulation initiation exemplify a skewed distribution of stakes.
Audit related policy initiation is determined primarily by a dominant minoritarian interest
group of accounting firms and their professional organizations. Investors, a typical
dispersed stakes majority group, do not influence audit policy initiation. That is, until the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. William Carney notes that "the story of Sarbanes-Oxley lacks the
usual indicia of interest group legislation. Perhaps the relevant interest group was
Congress itself, which believed it was purchasing votes from many uninformed voters on
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a highly visible issue. ,,68 Carney's tongue-in-cheek remark about Congress as an interest
group is inspired by, but does not accurately describe, a sudden, dramatic shift from
minority bias to majority bias within Congress.
Before fraud was exposed at Enron, Congress exhibited bias toward the
accounting lobby. In 2000, SEC chairman Arthur Levitt proposed a rule to Congress that
would prohibit auditors from performing non-audit services, such as consulting and
information system design, for their audit clients. 69 Levitt's concern was that audit firms
used the audit function as "loss leader retained as a foot in the door for higher-fee
consulting services.,,7o He argued that this would reduce audit quality, compromise
auditor independence, and jeopardize the public's interest in reliable financial statements.
The AICPA and many audit firms objected to Levitt's proposal to limit non-audit
services. They lobbied Congress, arguing that the majority of non-audit services increase
audit quality and benefit the economy. Some of the larger firms influenced key members
of Congress with large financial contributions, a practice common among accounting
firms, to increase political pressure on Levitt and the SEC. 7! Congress decided not to
legislate the proposed rule. The SEC attempted to support the rule with a study on the
degree to which non-audit fees were a part of accounting firms' total revenue, but the
largest accounting firms were not forthcoming with data or comments.72 Without a
countervailing majority group's support, Levitt was unsuccessful. In the end, a market
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approach was taken by the SEC: public companies were required to disclose the amounts
paid to incumbent auditors for audit and non-audit fees, and investors decided if the
auditor appeared satisfactorily independent. This is a case in which the SEC could not
overcome the indirect influence from minoritarian biases within Congress, and was
forced to create weaker rules because of direct pressure from interest groups.
After fraud at Enron was exposed in December of 200 1, the general public
became more likely to initiate audit policy because they perceived higher stakes and
gained access to low cost information through the media. Although audit policy was just
as complex after Enron as it was before, when even the SEC could not produce
compelling evidence to support proposed audit regulation, the media simplified the issue
for voters by amplifying the risk posed by compromised auditor independence to
efficiency in securities markets. Indictment of Andersen, even though it was not for
independence issues, confirmed the public suspicion that auditors were partly responsible
for fraud. Larry Ribstein comments that "public perceptions of risk ... played a
particularly potent role in the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.,,73 An initial
institutional choice is expected, considering, as Troy Parades does, that "strong
regulatory response to a wave of scandal appears to be consistent with historical
practice.,,74 Returning to previous analysis of participant factors in Congress, the SEC,
and the judiciary, one finds that Congress is far more likely to respond to majority
interests because of electora.l pressure. Participants are likely to initiate policy in
Congress because they are more familiar with Congressmen and have greater access to
Congressional policymaking.
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Congressional factors alone do not warrant an intuitive institutional choice. When
compared to Congress, the SEC is somewhat shielded from majorities. Even after Enron,
the stakes of most of those in the majority were not high enough to motivate members to
educate themselves on the processes of the agency. Catalytic subgroups within the
majority, which had already covered threshold costs for lobbying Congress, made it even
less likely that policy would be initiated in the SEC. The Consumers Union stimulated
majority action and directed it toward initiation of policy in Congress. 75 Participants are
not likely to initiate regulation of non-audit services in the federal courts immediately
following Enron because class actions do not help a majority as large and dispersed as the
general investing public.
Once Congress is aware that they are the publicly chosen institution for regulation
of non-audit services, a second comparative institutional choice analysis is needed.
Before formulating specific regulation, Congress should compare its capacity and
structural competence to institutional alternatives e.g. the SEC and federal courts.
In terms of capacity, Congress derives its power to regulate auditors, and anything
else commerce related, from the Commerce Clause. In 1934, however, Congress
delegated responsibility for setting and enforcing accounting standards to the SEC.
Although the agency is a subsidiary to Congress, its capacity for regulating auditors
appears to be at least equal to Congress' because of the Legislature's deference to the
SEC regarding audit regulation. The federal courts are eliminated from the analysis
because they do not have jurisdiction. Although investors could file civil suits against
audit firms before Sarbanes-Oxley, there was no federal regulation for auditors in regard
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to non-audit services. In terms of capacity, Congress is superior to the SEC because the
legislature uses statute to establish and modify the agency's authority.
In making comparisons of structural competence, it is not appropriate to
completely abandon participant-centered factors simply because the analysis is now
focused on the step of policy formulation. To choose an optimal institution, Congress
must consider how majoritarian biases limit deliberativeness, accessibility, and
representativeness. 76 More importantly, legislators must consider the variations in degree
to which biases limit structural competency between Congress and the SEC.
There are many critics of Congress' competence in regard to regulating auditors.
Of those who do not make the mistake of intuitive institutional choice based on expertise,
Lawrence A. Cunningham summarizes the appropriate criticisms of Congress'
competence most succinctly; noting that the provisions of SOX are "based less on a
calculated cost-benefit assessment of the likelihood of their effectiveness than a populist
need to exhibit taking control.,,77 Previous analysis concluded that Congress is generally
more rigorous, deliberative, accessible, and representative than the SEC. Could
limitations caused by majoritarian biases prove Cunningham correct? Or does
majoritarian bias actually enhance certain structural competencies?
A majoritarian bias does not limit or enhance representation within Congress or
the SEC. At the most, an influential majority reminds Congress of the importance of
constituent representation. Reminding Congress of its representatives does not increase

77
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, "The Appeal and Limits of Interna1 Controls to Fight Fraud,
Terrorism, and Other Ills," Iowa Journal of Corporate Law, 29 (2004): 280-81. Quoted in Joan MacLeod
Heminway, supra note 18: 69.

34

...

.

•

the relative structural competence of Congress compared to the SEC, it merely counters
minoritarian influences from interest groups with majoritarian influences from voters.
Directly after Enron, countervaliance between majoritarian and minoritarian
interests led to partisan factions within Congress that limited deliberativeness. On one
side, House Republicans Billy Tauzin, Richard Baker, and Michael Oxley advocated mild
regulation of non-audit services to avoid "blanket[ing] market participants in a sea of red
tape.,,78 Minority interest groups encouraged the limited measures offered by
Republicans. House Democrats, alternatively, proposed bills with more sweeping
reforms, including a longer list of prohibited non-audit services. The Democrats
approached the issue of audit reform as an opportunity to expose their counterpart's
softness towards the accounting lobby, and they were backed by consumer advocacy
groups.79 Deliberation between partisan factions in Congress was limited by particularly
contentious politicization of the issue of audit reform. Although Republicans succeeded
in passing their bill in the House, a Democrat in the Senate, Paul Sarbanes, was
ultimately successful in finalizing a more restrictive list of prohibited non-audit services
when frauds at Worldcom and Xerox reignited majority pressure on Congress. Rather
than extending deliberation to address the unique causes of the new frauds, Senate
Republicans were forced to "get out of the way of the Senate measures. ,,80
In comparison, the SEC offered only one rule proposal that was largely ignored
because of the popularity of audit reform as a political topic. The structure of the SEC is
not designed to harness the power of majorities to the extent that Congress does. With
78
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political topics, voters are likely to recognize greater influence over elected officials than
appointed officials. The SEC is accessible, but independent. Heated political debate
further limited collaborative deliberation between the SEC and Congress. Leaders within
SEC recognized majoritarian pressure and, realizing that they would not overcome it,
lobbied Congress for a bigger budget so it could handle the enforcement of new
legislation.
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where politics drives the process.,,82
Access, on the contrary, is enhanced in Congress by majoritarian biases. Minority
interest groups, who are often invited to testify, and the general public enjoy greater
access through Congressional hearings. The accounting firms were quite successful in
limiting the regulatory reach of Oxley's house bill (HR 3763), passed on April 4, 2002. If
not for the exposure of accounting fraud at Worldcom and Xerox in July 2002,
accounting lobbyists may have convinced Sarbanes to limit the regulatory reach of the
Senate's draft ofHR 3763. Congress also increased access to members of the majority by
reaching out to constituents for comment during campaigns. House minority leader
Richard Gephardt D-MO said, "I had any number of people come up to me in
neighborhood meetings and ask me 'What are you in the government going to do about

Access to the SEC is similarly enhanced to the extent that Congress uses the
agency as an investigative collaborator. Throughout the process of legislative
investigation Congress can ask the SEC to conduct studies of the issue. In preparing its
own rule proposals in times of majoritarian influence, the SEC will likely receive more
81
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comments from minorities to countervail growing majority power than from majorities
that favor increased influence over Congress.

V.

Conclusions

This ex post analysis of institutional choice concludes that majoritarian interests
prefer Congress over the SEC and the federal courts for initiating policy reform in the
midst of crises. With Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress did indeed make a preemptive
institutional choice based solely on capacity. Comparison of structural competence
suggests that the SEC is equipped to handle audit reforms, but that majority interests will
most likely initiate audit reform in Congress because of the representative design. Had
Congress performed an institutional choice comparison, it would become apparent that
majoritarian biases limit deliberation. With more deliberation, it is likely that the SEC
would have played a greater role in crafting Sarbanes-Oxley. SEC chairman Harvey Pitt
was eager to propose and argue for audit reform with limited reach. The repeated
occurrence of fraud, however, intensified majoritarian bias within Congress, and the SEC
proposal was discarded.
The conclusion of this comparative analysis of the institutional choices leading to
Sarbanes-Oxley is that majoritarian interests are likely to initiate audit reforms in
Congress when perceived stakes increase and low cost information is provided by the
media. Action from the general investing public is directed toward Congress by catalytic
subgroups that have already covered the threshold costs of identifying stakes, organizing
politically, and developing sophistication with channels of influence. In addition,
Congress increases the likelihood that it will be chosen by reaching out to constituents
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with politically charged issues during election years. The SEC and federal courts have far
less control over policy initiation because they are not representative.
Maintaining efficient markets with optimal audit regulation is most likely to be
the result of a collaborative, deliberative effort between Congress and the SEC. The very
existence of the SEC suggests that Congress would want the agency to participate in
formulating regulation that it must enforce. The agency certainly has the capacity and
structural competencies required to regulate auditors. Sarbanes-Oxley, however, was
formulated solely by Congress. Many critics of the SOX point to Congress' domination
of policy formulation as cause of many problems with the substantive details of the Act. 84
The combined framework explains Congress' preemptive decision as the result of
a strong majoritarian bias created by escalating anxiety over repeated accounting frauds
and intense electoral pressure. Analysis with the combined framework, however, is
limited by flaws in its design. One of its major flaws is the assumption that, after
comparative analysis, an institution would relinquish its authority during the step of
policy formulation. For instance, after the investing public made resounding demands for
Congress to fix the problems leading to fraud, legislators would be politically foolish to
suggest the SEC is better for the task. In the presence of majoritarian bias, institutional
choice should focus on the degree to which Congress allows agencies to participate.
Considering that minority interests prevented a SEC proposal of audit reform that might
have prevented fraud caused by compromised auditor independence in 2000, it is feasible
to say that Congress limits agency participation in the presence of minoritarian bias as
well.

84

See Joan MacLeod Heminway, supra note 18: 4-6.
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Future Research
Policy analysts are still gleaning the most valuable lessons from the SarbanesOxley Act. In 2005, the New York Times reported that many corporate and accounting
leaders are criticizing the cost of compliance with SOX.85 The cost of compliance with
Section 404, which requires internal control assessments, has, for some corporations,
rivaled the cost of financial statement audits. Ignoring the cost of compliance costs is
another flaw in the combined framework. Future analyses of factors that affect
institutional choice should discuss costs of compliance (transition costs) because it is
likely that institutional variations exist. Legal transition costs should also be included to
identify the frictions associated with a change in legal regime. The creation of the
PCAOB with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act would be a particularly fruitful starting point for
comparative analysis of legal transition costs. Regardless of which framework is used for
comparison, future research should include the PCAOB as evidence of its abilities
become more widely available to determine whether the costs of increased bureaucracy
offset the benefits of an independent public oversight board.
The effects of difficult institutional choices are present in every public policy. The
economic analysis of law, though it recognizes such effects, does not enable the analyst
to fully appreciate how alternative institutional choices lead to variations in policy
outcome. Single institutional analysis leads to intuitive conclusions about why
institutions were chosen to regulate a given area in the past, and why they should
continue to do so in the future. It is by parallel comparison of imperfect institutional

See Jonathon D. Glater, "Here it Comes: The Sarbanes-Oxley Backlash," New York Times, 17
April 2005, Business section.
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alternatives that the policy analyst absorbs the difficulties of institutional choice and
constructs a more comprehensive framework for understanding policy outcomes.
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